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The Downside of Disruption: The Risks
Associated with Transformational Change
in the Delivery of Legal Services
Raymond H. Brescia1

Change is coming to the legal profession. New forms of communicating, researching, advertising,
finding clients, serving clients, and preparing documents are transforming the way legal services
are delivered in the 21st century.2 The advent of new technologies, like the internet, machine
learning, and mobile communications have put the legal profession on the cusp of what business
theorist Clayton Christensen calls “disruptive innovation”: transformative shifts in a market for
a product or service that threaten the business models, and even the very existence, of incumbent
actors within that market.3 In the legal profession, these technology-enabled changes are
streamlining all aspects of the delivery of legal services. They are changing the ways that lawyers
identify, market to, and secure clients; conduct legal research; prepare court documents; compile
and review discovery; collaborate with other lawyers, clients and experts; and prepare contracts,
patent applications and other legal documents. In short, the evolution of the legal profession in
the United States is entering a phase where we will see greater digitization, commoditization, and
atomization of legal services that will result in a streamlining of such services in ways that make
it more efficient and less costly. This streamlining holds out the promise that all aspects of the
lawyer’s role can be made easier and more affordable to more consumers. But it is not without
its risks.
For some lawyers and law firms, the disruption of the current model of legal services delivery
means that they will be forced to change the way they provide services or risk the loss of customers
and income. For others, those who adapt to the new legal landscape, they will likely thrive, only
if they are able to utilize technology to change the way they do business, lower the costs of the
services they provide, and find new clients to make up for the loss of revenue that will likely
accompany new methods of service provision. Richard Susskind has discussed the fate of the legal
profession in its current form and declared the still evolving disruption in the legal profession as
the “End of Lawyers.”4 Others are not so sure.5 Even Susskind plots out what he anticipates to
be the new roles that lawyers will assume in a newly-enhanced, digitally-enabled legal landscape,
and still finds a range of functions lawyers can fill in this new landscape, even if they are different
from those they fill today.6
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	For an overview of some of these changes, see Raymond H. Brescia et al., Embracing Disruption: How Technological
Change in the Delivery of Legal Services Can Improve Access to Justice, 78 Alb. L. Rev. 553 (2015) (hereinafter
“Embracing Disruption”).
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	Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (1997).
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	Richard Susskind, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services (2008).

	Susskind is not without his detractors. See, e.g., Paul F. Kirgis, The Knowledge Guild: The Legal Profession in an
Age of Technological Change, 11 Nev. L. J. 184 (Fall 2010) (arguing that technological change in the delivery of legal
services that makes it easier to access and less expensive, coupled with increased complexity and heterogeneity
in society, may increase the demand for legal services generally not reduce it).
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Disruption and the “Low” End of the Legal Services Market
Most will agree that while the changes to incumbent firms in the legal services market as we
currently know it may be dramatic, the potential benefits to the consumer and prospective
consumer of legal services are also significant. Indeed, the streamlining of services likely means
that significant cost savings can be passed on to the consumer. In a legal market where eighty
percent of the legal needs of low-income Americans and half of the legal needs of middle-income
Americans remain unaddressed,7 mostly because those with such needs cannot afford an attorney,
any disruption to the cost of legal services will likely inure to the benefit of those who cannot
otherwise afford an attorney, as streamlined—and less expensive—services will be closer to the
reach to a broader segment of society.
But this disruption, what Schumpeter called “creative destruction”—is both creative and
destructive.8 It will not be without its costs. The costs to the legal profession could be significant.
While some may argue that the technology-enabled innovations in the provision of legal services
could mean there will be less of a need for lawyers, I believe the significant “justice gap” – the fact
that a significant number of Americans face their legal problems without a lawyer simply because
they cannot afford one -- means there is plenty of work to go around, provided the price is right.
Once the cost of services, scope of services, need for services, and ability of prospective clients
to pay for services all meet on a particular price point, there could be a significant increase in
customer demand for legal services, and a greater demand for lawyers to meet that need.
For many lamenting the advent of disruption in the legal services field, they turn to the impact of
new technological innovations, and the social innovations they spur (like the ability to outsource
document review), on large, incumbent law firms, instead of turning to where true disruptive
innovation tends to appear. According to Christensen, true disruption in a market occurs at the
lower ends of that market, where incumbent goods and services are both out of reach of that end
of the market, but where those goods and services have features that exceed the need.9 Indeed, few
consumers of legal services would choose to pay tens of thousands of dollars to defend themselves
in a traffic violation action, yet if they were paying a high-end lawyer his or her hourly rate to
represent the client, that is what the services would cost.
If we take this view of the legal profession, and look at the low end of the market to identify
opportunities for true disruptive innovation, it is in the provision of services to low- and moderateincome communities where this type of innovation will unfold. As Christensen and his coauthors recently reiterated in an article for the Harvard Business Review, the theory of disruptive
innovation looks for change first in the lower ends of a given market, not in the wealthier and
more expensive corner of the market.10
If this is the case—that true disruptive innovation will occur where legal services are crafted to
meet the needs of low- and moderate-income Americans, what are the prospective benefits that
can accrue to such communities by the provision of streamlined, efficient, and less costly services?
Perhaps equally important, what are the potential downsides of such innovation?

	Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education and Research, 62 J. Legal Educ. 531, 531 (2013).
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	Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book That Will Change the Way You Do Business
16 (2011 ed.) (noting that disruptive innovation begins at the lower end of a given market and slowly works its way
into the mainstream, displacing incumbents).
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The Upside of Disruption
It goes without saying that the potential benefits of expanded access to justice for low- and
moderate-income Americans are too many to mention. Should new forms of legal services
delivery truly expand access to justice, families who receive representation in housing court will
have assistance avoiding homelessness. Individuals seeking Veterans Administration benefits
will obtain health care, educational assistance, and counseling. Families fleeing intimate partner
violence will find safety, housing, and assistance with any immigration issues they may face as a
result of the violence they face. Workers will have assistance obtaining unemployment or workers
compensation benefits. Families will avoid mortgage foreclosure. The benefits are legion. But
in addition to the concrete and real benefits that will accrue to these individuals and families, a
society that prides itself on the notion of “Equal Justice Under Law,” will be able to come closer
to meeting that promise by ensuring that no one will have to face their legal problems without
adequate legal representation.
The practical and societal benefits of greater access to justice that might come about should legal
services become affordable for those who pay for their own services, or more accessible for those
who still cannot, because the providers of free legal services to the indigent can meet more of the
need for such services because the funding dollars go farther, are significant. However, what are
the risks associated with this technology-enabled approach to the provision of legal services? The
remainder of this essay attempts to identify those risks and assess their import, and whether they
stand as barriers to a new access to justice paradigm made possible by disruptive innovation in the
delivery of legal services.
The Downside of Disruption
Putting aside the fact that technology-enabled changes to the legal profession could mean
significant disruption (for lack of a better term) of the incomes, job prospects, and plans of
lawyers currently serving in incumbent firms, those in law school today, and those who still wish
to attend law school in the near future, this essay will focus on some of the downside risk of
disruptive innovation in the provision of legal services as it might impact low- and moderateincome consumers (and potential consumers) of legal services.
Will disruption really bring about greater access to justice on the lower end of the legal
services market?
It is quite possible that Christensen’s model of disruptive innovation—where true disruption
occurs at the lower end of the market and works its way up, eventually taking significant market
share from incumbents until they completely displace those incumbents—will not happen in the
legal services market. At present, while there are outliers, groups like Pro Bono Net, the national
LawHelp network, CrowdDefend, and others that are looking to technology to help close the
justice gap,11 most of the innovations in the delivery of legal services are targeted towards a
wealthier clientele, or are being marketed directly to lawyers, not clients. While some websites
are offering matchmaking services like LawDingo and Avvo, which make finding a lawyer easier, a
group like LegalZoom appears to be the closest thing to a provider of legal services that is trying
11

	Naree Chan, Can Technology Help the Middle Class Close the Justice Gap?, Jurist, Dec. 12, 2015, http://jurist.org/
professional/2015/12/naree-chan-justice-gap.php.
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to offer an affordable alternative to the lower end and middle of the market for legal services. But
the services they offer are limited in nature. The LegalZoom interface is using what some might
call a “one-size-fits-all” approach with much of the services it provides, and when one looks at the
types of issues LegalZoom handles, it is hard to find assistance—let alone representation—in the
types of cases that are most pressing for low- and moderate-income individuals and families, like
evictions and foreclosures or veterans’ benefits.12 While there are certainly low- and moderateincome individuals who need a provisional patent, one of the services offered through LegalZoom,
such a need is not high on many low-income individuals’ hierarchy of legal needs. If providers of
disruptive legal services do not focus on the legal needs of low- and moderate-income individuals
and families, such disruption will have little effect on closing the justice gap and improving access
to justice in the fields where it is most needed.
Are disruptive services truly competent and effective legal services?
While the advent of technology-enabled services seems to serve as a harbinger of radical change in
the provision of legal services, a question remains: are such services truly competent and effective?
Indeed, are they legal services at all? A quick review of the LegalZoom website offers a disclaimer
(one that has been litigated over in many states), that says quite clearly that the information
provided over the LegalZoom website, which offers a range of services, from brief advice and
information to model forms one can fill out, are not, in fact, legal services.13 Closing the justice gap
can only come about by the provision of legal services. And it is only the provision of legal services
that is subject to the types of quality control that comes about through adherence to the ethical
rules that govern attorney behavior and the ethics machinery—from bar associations to judicial
panels on ethics and the courts—that oversees it. While some may argue that the availability of
technology-enabled services, where the alternative is no services whatsoever because of a lack of
access to justice, could be better than nothing, that is not the case when the services rendered are
so bad that a client-customer is worse off than she would have been without the assistance.
The first thing to ensure that the services rendered meet the standards of competence and zeal
required of lawyers under their ethical obligations to their clients is to monitor the provision of
these new, technology-enabled services for their compliance with such ethical obligations. And
for that to start these technology-enabled services will have to make it clear to their customers
whether they are holding themselves out as lawyers or not. If they are, they must comply with their
ethical obligations as attorneys. If they are not, they should make it clear to their customers the
role they are filling, and what, if any, consumer protections are available to the customer. Again,
a customer of such services could be made worse off by misguided, uninformed and incompetent
advice that places his or her legal rights in jeopardy. If one wins the trust of a customer and
that customer places that trust in the service provider, that provider should be trustworthy and
competent in the services he or she is rendering.
12

	
www.legalzoom.com (website offers a wide array of legal services for consumers to utilize).
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	The LegalZoom disclaimer provides as follows:
Disclaimer: Communications between you and LegalZoom are protected by our Privacy Policy but not
by the attorney-client privilege or as work product. LegalZoom provides access to independent attorneys
and self-help services at your specific direction. We are not a law firm or a substitute for an attorney or
law firm. We cannot provide any kind of advice, explanation, opinion, or recommendation about possible
legal rights, remedies, defenses, options, selection of forms or strategies. Your access to the website is
subject to our Terms of Use.

	Disclaimer, LegalZoom, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited May 15, 2016). For an overview of the litigation
regarding LegalZoom with respect to whether the business is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, see
Embracing Disruption, supra note 2, at 583-585.
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Will technology-enabled services miss those without access to technology?
In a digitized legal profession, some consumers will first seek information from the on-line and
mobile portals that might offer them legal insights and guidance and they will then end their
search for answers instead of seeking out further assistance of an attorney; they will then turn
to their legal problems armed with the information and guidance they obtained in their search.
Others will fill out an on-line questionnaire and perhaps obtain a pre-packaged form or pleading
that they will use to attempt to address their legal dispute on their own. Still others will seek brief
advice and assistance, perhaps speaking to an attorney or legal “navigator” who will provide some
level of guidance. Finally, some will rely on direct, so-called “bespoke” services or individually
tailored legal services, paying a premium for the privilege.
The extent to which the consumer feels she can address the presenting legal problem through
the level of service she accesses will, to a certain degree, drive the selection of the approach the
consumer takes. What is more likely, however, is that the consumer’s ability to afford a particular
level of service will likely drive the decision to select among the particular options available. In
other words, resources, not need, will still dictate the consumer’s decision, just as they do today.
Does that mean the promise of access to justice will still come down to resources and income?
Apart from the direct impact of resources on access to justice, even when legal services are
more affordable, other resource barriers to the availability of legal services, even ones that are
technology enabled, will still exist. While concerns over the so-called “digital divide” have
diminished over recent years, and more and more low- and moderate-income consumers have
access to the internet and mobile technology in the form of smart phones, if technology is going
to be the new avenue through which the justice gap is to be addressed, one cannot overlook the
fact that there are still parts of the country and communities where access to broadband and
cellular services is either non-existent or unreliable.14 Technology-enabled services are only an
effective means of meeting the promise of access to justice if individuals and families of low- and
moderate-income communities have access to the technology that makes such access to justice
possible. Expanding access to justice through technology will thus require a concomitant
increase in access to technology. Since the Great Recession, the federal government has taken
steps to address the digital divide and to support state and local government efforts to do so as
well. In early 2009, as part of the federal stimulus package, Congress adopted measures designed
to expand digital access.15 As a part of that effort, the Federal Communications Commission
issued a report, in 2010, outlining specific steps for doing so.16 While a discussion of the specific
strategies for closing the digital divide are beyond the scope of this essay, any expansion of the use
of technology to promote access to justice will necessarily require concomitant actions that also
expand access to that technology.

14

	For a description of the present state of digital access, see The White House, Council on Economic Advisors Issue
Brief, Mapping the Digital Divide (July 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/wh_digital_divide_
issue_brief.pdf.

15

	American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C. § 1305 (describing goals and purposes of the
Broadband Technology Opportunities Program).

16

	Federal Communications Commission, Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan xi (2010), available at https://
transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf.
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Will technology-enabled “triage” of clients miss important legal issues?
Part of the promise of technology-enabled services is the triage function that internet and mobile
interfaces can serve. Such services can help to screen cases that are appropriate for a one-size-fits-all
approach and direct them to the appropriate level of service within the legal services institution.
This sort of triage occurs in legal services offices and for-profit firms every day. But such services can
be labor intensive, and must be managed by someone versed in the range of issues the office handles
so he or she can appropriately direct the client to the right place within the organization, or make a
referral outside the organization. Technology holds out the promise that this sort of triaging can be
done without the intervention of a live person, through virtual interviews, questionnaires, surveys
and other means. But a virtual “interview” conducted via a questionnaire or survey can be filled out
wrong by the consumer, or the interface can ask the wrong questions and can miss important issues
affecting the client. Whether it is a misstep of the client in navigating a triage portal, a poorly framed
question, or a survey that does not anticipate every possible permutation of every possible case, it is
possible that critical facts will be missed and the triage service will go awry, missing important points
or directing a customer to information or services that are not helpful, or, worse, harmful. Under the
lawyer’s ethical obligations to the client, the failure to flag important legal issues, or to fail to advise
the client on legal issues beyond the scope of the representation about which the client should be
made aware, can be cause for a finding of malpractice and/or breach of fiduciary duty.17 While it
is certainly possible for a technology-enabled interface to anticipate every potential minefield and
pitfall a customer may face, time will tell whether triage is an area where machines can function at
least as well as, if not better than, humans.
Will disruptively innovative, yet digitized, commoditized and atomized services allow for
systemic change or undercut opportunities for collective action?
Returning to the potential service delivery landscape—where clients access services along a
continuum, from accessing services from a website to full representation—it is likely that many
prospective customers will find themselves treated in a vacuum, so to speak, where they cannot
connect to other individuals facing similar problems. This atomization may have profound
effects on the ability of consumers to collaborate together to advance social change. In fact, the
availability of digitized services, which can be accessed by the click of a mouse or through a swipe
on a smart phone, could lead to a weakening of the possibility of collective action. If a consumer
can find some degree of assistance, no matter how shallow, will it lead her to forego opportunities
to work together with other consumers in collective action or to engage in broader mobilization?
This is, of course, the classic tension between political organizing and the provision of direct
services that has arisen in debates around the right approach to the delivery of legal services.18
Will a digitized, atomized approach to the provision of legal services tilt the balance, placing
opportunities for mass mobilization beyond the reach of legal services providers?
Perhaps, but it does not have to be that way. With the possibilities unlocked by the tools of Big
Data, providers of legal services—even in their digitized, atomized form—can use information
gleaned from consumer complaints and the issues that arise in communications with prospective
	See, e.g., Nichols v. Keller, 15 Cal.App.4th 1672 (5th Dist. Cal. 1993) (finding failure to advise on potential third-party
claims in workers compensation representation constitutes malpractice). In the criminal context, see Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2009) (finding failure to advise client on the immigration effects of criminal convictions
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel).
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	See Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers & the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960-1973, at 33-34 (1993) (describing
some of the early tensions over service delivery as opposed to law reform or political mobilizations).
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clients to seek out patterns of legal issues and identify opportunities for mass mobilization and
broader legal action. Such an approach can use data analytics that seek to identify and then
address common problems that call out for common solutions. Indeed, this is one of the potential
promises of commoditization: that as patterns of legal issues begin to come into focus, astute,
alert, and agile providers of legal services can mobilize a response that is efficient and effective.
By having the ability to reach more consumers and have “antennae” seeking out patterns, it is
possible that new modes of legal services delivery will identify more opportunities for collective
legal responses, simply because more patterns will emerge from more communications with more
consumers, made possible by a digital and easy-to-access customer interface.
By no means is such an outcome foregone, or even likely, but, legal services providers in a new
era of legal services delivery should seek opportunities to apply new models of marketing,
data collection, analysis and service delivery in ways that identify common problems. In turn,
such common problems may call for a commoditized response, one that is more efficient than
representing individual clients to address their individual—yet shared—problems. Indeed, if the
commoditization of the delivery of legal services holds out any significant promise, particularly for
access to justice, it is that the more often a problem presents itself, the more likely a legal services
provider will develop expertise to address that problem and construct a method of responding to
it that is more efficient, more effective, and less costly than alternative approaches.
To date, social justice advocates have not used data mining and “Big Data” analytics to advance
social causes. The closest thing to such an approach is the way that these techniques have found
their way into electoral campaigns.19 The delivery of legal services through a commoditized,
high-volume approach will likely help generate data on trends, common problems, and legal and
geographic “hot spots,” much the way large cities like New York City are relying on data from
citizen complaints to isolate and address problem issues and areas.20 Advocates can harness the
information gleaned from contacts with clients to identify areas for systemic change; as similar
patterns surface, targeted strategies can be deployed to address them. And with such problems
coming in at such a high volume, advocates can deploy different tactics to try to solve them, see
which ones are the most effective, and take them to scale.
Will devoting resources to technology-enabled and commoditized services divert funds from
traditional legal services providers or call into question the need for the services they provide?
The last concern I will address here in terms of the potential downsides of disruption in the legal
services industry is the possibility that devoting attention, and resources, to expanding access to
justice through disruptive, digital, commoditized, and technology-enabled services will not just
result in a decrease in funding for traditional legal services programs that presently help close
the justice gap, but will generate calls to defund such programs because new models provide
“just enough” justice. These are, of course, legitimate concerns. By providing some degree of
services to low-income consumers (we will put aside moderate-income consumers because there
is virtually no governmental or philanthropic support for such efforts at present), will this end up
undermining efforts to provide full funding, or even funding at present levels, for traditional legal
	On the evolving use of data analytics in political campaigns, see David Nickerson and Todd Rodgers, Political
Campaigns and Big Data, 28 J. Econ. Perspectives 51 (Spring 2014).

19

20

	For a description of how New York City government is using big data to identify and address problems requiring
city attention, see Alexander Howard, How New York City Is Using Big Data to Serve Its Residents, Huffington Post
(Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/how-new-york-city-is-using-big-data-to-serve-its-residents_5
6461423e4b08cda34887f1a.
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services providers? Given the political forces historically aligned against funding for legal services
for poor and marginalized communities, it is likely that they would look for any argument, and
any opportunity, to reduce the resources available to such providers.
Yet, at present, low- and moderate-income consumers face their legal problems without the benefit
of legal assistance at an alarming rate. It is hard to tell them they should continue to go without
some legal assistance, regardless of the form, because some other, potential beneficiaries of legal
services might lose the assistance they might receive if services are expanded and broadened to
reach a larger segment of the population. This is the classic ethical conundrum. Should many go
without so that some can continue to receive a higher degree of service? Assuming that it is indeed
a risk that attention to providing a lower “level” of service, provided in a digitized, commoditized
form, to many will undercut the more traditional services that some receive, it is appropriate to
debate the likely effect such attention will have, and to grapple with the best outcome: some for
many or more for a few. Such a debate is worth having, but it should not get in the way of some
degree of experimentation, i.e., efforts that can help assess whether new modes of legal services
delivery can help close the justice gap in meaningful ways, ways that might help meet the broader
goal of access to justice.
Conclusion
The evolution of the American legal profession is likely about to embark on a new phase, one that
will see new modes of service delivery that are technology-enabled, digitized, commoditized and
atomized. This evolution holds out the promise that it might make legal services more affordable
for moderate-income individuals and families and more obtainable for those of low income. The
potential downsides, some of which are addressed here, are real, but they are also worth exploring,
anticipating, discussing, and addressing. No fundamental shift in an industry and a profession
is not without its risks. It is also possible that theorists like Christensen and Susskind are wrong:
that disruptive innovation is not coming to the legal profession, and that the theory of disruption
itself is not an accurate way to think about or look at sectoral change.21 Regardless of one’s views
of Christensen’s theory of the ways in which disruptive innovation impacts markets, it is hard
to argue with the idea that technology has transformed and is transforming the practice of law.
What is more, those who can navigate these technological advances to make legal services more
affordable will make great strides toward closing the justice gap.
The fundamental transformation of American journalism made possible by the internet and
mobile technologies means both that the grip of traditional media has been weakened, while
there has never been more access to information. Many can debate the benefits of this shift and
whether it is better for the consumer of information and society in general. So, too, with the
coming transformation of the legal profession. There are many risks, but there are also many
potential benefits, like the possibility of improving access to justice in meaningful ways. Those
interested in reducing the justice gap can manage change, or change can just happen, with
unforeseen, and perhaps undesirable consequences. The more we discuss the risks associated with
the change, the more we can address them, and this essay, and the essays in this volume, help to
unleash, identify, explore, and assess appropriate ways to manage and harness change in beneficial
ways that can improve and enhance access to justice for all Americans. •
21
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	For a critique of Christensen’s theories of disruptive innovation, see Jill Lepore, The Disruption Machine: What the
Gospel of Innovation Gets Wrong, The New Yorker, June 23, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/
the-disruption-machine.
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